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Boruff v. United States
31o F.2d 918 (5 th Cir. 1962)
Boruff appeared with assigned counsel at his trial and when sentenced,
but neither counsel nor the court advised him of his rights with respect to
appeal and his right to have counsel assigned for appeal. Approximately
four months after sentencing, Boruff filed notice of appeal.' The trial
court allowed the appeal but reserved the question of timeliness to the
court in the instant case. The court of appeals held that Boruff was de-
prived of his right to the assistance of counsel and that therefore the ten
day limitation on filing notice of appeal set forth in Rule 37(a) (2)2 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not begin to run until he
was actually advised of his rights concerning appeal. Consideration on
the merits revealed that venue was clearly improper and the case was
remanded for a judgment of acquital. The dissenting judge, relying on
the interpretation given Rule 45(b) 3 in United States v. Robinson,4 took
the position that the limitation began to run when Boruff was sentenced,
and that due to the jurisdictional and mandatory nature of the ten day
limitation, the only relief available was collateral attack.5
I Boruff v. United States, 310 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962).
2 Fed. R. Crim. P. 37(a) (2):
Time for Taking Appeal. An appeal by a defendant may be taken within
10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion
for a new trial or in arrest of judgment had been made within the 10 day
period an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days
after entry of the order denying the motion. When a court after trial imposes
sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be
advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare
and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant.
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 45 (b) :
Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within
a specific time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if applica-
tion therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion permit the act to
be done after the expiration of the specified time period if the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but the court may not enlarge the period
for taking any actions under Rules 33, 34, and 35, except as otherwise pro-
vided in those rules, or the period for taking an appeal.
4 361 U.S. 220 (1960), noted in 48 Calif. L. Rev. 333 (1960). The Court held
that Rule 45 (b) prohibited enlargement of limitation where notice of appeal was filed
late due to excusable neglect.
1 Boruff v. United States, supra note 1, at 924.
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The jurisdictional and mandatory view of the limitation taken by the
dissenting judge was traditional when the present rules were adopted.
There was no uniform notion as to the limitation's proper length.6 Rather
the limitation seems to have been arbitrarily set on the theory that appeal,
as a separate action, was strictly a statutory right and that expediency
and procedural convenience could therefore be paramount.7 The separate
action concept is the reason for regarding the limitation on notice of appeal
as jurisdictional in nature8 and transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate
court as the first step in taking an appeal.9 As a manner of describing
the finality attributed to the limitation on filing notice of appeal when
appeal was a matter of statutory grace, the term "jurisdictional" was con-
veniently appropriate. Thus, at the time the rules were adopted, it could be
said that the limitation on notice of appeal effectively denied jurisdiction
to the appellate court.
Since adoption of the rules, the right to appeal has taken on a con-
stitutional character and assistance of counsel has become a constitutional
requisite in protecting the right.' ° This does not conflict with the view
that Congress may abolish the appellate procedure in the federal courts. As
long as Congress provides an appellate process for men of means, the fed-
eral constitution requires that it also be available to indigents. The in-
digent defendant's right to appeal rests on the doctrine of Griffin v.
Illinois." Though Griffin is a state case, its legal reasoning is applicable in
the federal courts through fifth amendment due process of law.1 2 An in-
6 Brunyate, "The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930," 49 L.Q.
Rev. 192, 204 (1933): "According to English ideas the period is a long one; but it
is perhaps not an unreasonable compromise between the two days or three days
allowed in California and Massachusetts respectively, and the eight months of West
Virginia, the year of Montana, Wisconsin and Wyoming, and the two years of
Kansas."
7 See Ray v. United States, 301 U.S. 158, 163 (1937); 48 Calif. L. Rev. 333,
335 (1960).
8 48 Calif. L. Rev. 333, 335 (1960).
9 See Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 140-41 (1939).
10 United States v. Johnson, 238 F2d 565 (5th Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
11 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
12 Id. at 17: "Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central
aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as
law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court.'" Accord, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). In United States v. Johnson,
supra note 10, at 567, judge Frank said, "It would seem clear that the Griffin
doctrine, via the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, applies as well to a poor
man's appeal from a Federal conviction." In Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 456 (1961), Mr. Justice Stewart said in reference to the right to appeal in
forma pauperis: "the statutory safeguard against over indulgence in free frivolous
appeals cannot be allowed to impinge upon the fundamental right of every litigant,
rich or poor, to equal consideration before the courts." See Ridge, "The Indigent
Defendant: A Procedural Dilemma for the Courts," 24 F.R.D. 243, 251 (1960).
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digent's appeal is to be as adequate and effective as an appeal by a man of
means. 13 The limitation on filing notice of appeal makes notice the sine
qua non of appeal. Therefore, in order that the opportunity to appeal be
adequate and effective, the opportunity to file notice of appeal must be
equal. The cases relied upon by the dissent did not involve the instant
constitutional question: the defendants were either represented by re-
tained counsel, as in Robinson, or the limitation on filing notice of appeal
was not in issue.14  Though some cases cannot be reconciled with the
instant case, 1 the cases relied upon by the dissent do not refute the con-
clusion that the limitation on filing notice of appeal may no longer be
regarded as wholly mandatory and jurisdictional where the indigent de-
fendant's constitutional right to equal opportunity of appeal has been
violated. This is true because appeal is now considered a continuation of
the criminal prosecution' 6-- an integral part of the trial system of adjudica-
tion' 7 -which is fundamental to due process of law. The limitation on
filing notice of appeal is no different from any other procedural rule. Where
it offends the Constitution it must yield.
Having decided that the Constitution required that Boruff be granted
an appeal, the majority had to interpret the rules to obtain the required
result. The majority held that not being advised by assigned counsel was
equivalent to not being represented by counsel within the meaning of Rule
37(a) (2).18 The next question was whether the limitation had run. A
Equal access to justice is clearly a present day standard which applies to the right
to appeal.
13 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447 (1961).
14 Assigned counsel and the limitation in Rule 37(a) (2) are the key factors
which combine to raise the constitutional question in the instant case. Where
counsel is retained, the question of equal opportunity of appeal is not raised. Where
the limitation is other than the limitation in Rule 37(a)(2), there is no question
regarding the right to appeal. Supra note 3. Cases not containing both key factors
are distinguishable from Boruff. Robinson v. United States, 260 F2d 718, 721 n. 1
(D.C.Cir. 1958), rev'd, United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (retained
counsel); United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947) (Rule 33; mandamus setting
aside order for new trial after case was affirmed on appeal); Hodges v. United
States, 282 F2d 858, 861 n.4 (D.C.Cir. 1960) (retained counsel); Marion v.
United States, 171 F2d 185, (9th Cir. 1948) (retained counsel). See generally 4
L. Ed. 2d 1854 (1959) [construction and application of Rule 45(b)].
15 By way of dictum in Coppedge, supra note 13, at 442 n. 5, the court said in
reference to Rule 37(a) (2) :
The statutory purpose of this provision may, however, not be achieved
when the defendant appears at sentencing with counsel. If neither counsel,
whether retained or court appointed, nor the district judge imposing sentence,
notifies the defendant of the requirement for filing a prompt notice of appeal,
the right of appeal may be irrevocably lost.
See also United States v. Parker, 208 F. Supp. 920 (D. Mass. 1962).
16 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957), explained in Application of
Dinerstein, 258 F2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1958).
17 Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 11, at 18.
Is 310 F.2d at 921.
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finding that the limitation had run would have necessitated interpreting
Rule 45(b) concerning enlargement. The specificity of Rule 45(b) would
have required finding it unconstitutional as applied. 19 Holding that the
running of the limitation was postponed avoided a ruling on Rule 45(b)
by allowing Boruff's notice of appeal to fall within the ten day limitation.
However, the court did 'not expressly reconcile the language of Rule
37(a) (2) which states that the limitation begins to run upon entry of
judgment.20  It appears that the majority interpreted "entry of judgment,"
as used in Rule 37(a) (2), to presume that the indigent defendant is ad-
vised of his rights concerning appeal by either court or counsel and where
this presumption is unfounded, the limitation does not begin to run.2 1
Though this interpretation was not expressed by the drafters, it produces
an outcome in harmony with the intended purpose and construction of the
rules.
22
How was the district court expected to know that Boruff was not
represented by counsel within the terms of Rule 37(a) (2) when assigned
counsel appeared with him at sentencing? The majority found that the
district court had an affirmative duty under Rule 44 to inquire as to the
intentions of assigned counsel to advise on rights concerning appeal.23
This finding is well supported. 24  Assignment of counsel alone does not
19 Rule 45(b) specifically states that "the court may not enlarge . . . the period
for taking an appeal." These words have been given their clear meaning. United
States v. Robinson, supra note 4.
20 Supra note 2.
21 In Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240, 245 (9th Cir. 1963) the court said:
The framers of Rule 37 undoubtedly believed that where the defendant was
represented by counsel at the trial, the counsel would advise the defendant of
his right to appeal and either prepare the notice for him or advise him that
by filing a simple statement in writing stating in substance, 'I appeal from
the judgment and sentence,' he could preserve his right to appellate review.
Hence no provision appears in Rule 37 covering the situation where the
defendant was represented by counsel at the trial.
22 Fed. R. Crim. P. 2:
Purpose and Construction. These rules are intended to provide for the deter-
mination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.
23 310 F.2d at 921. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44:
Assignment of Counsel. If the defendant appears in court without counsel,
the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to rep-
resent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed with-
out counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
24 The affirmative duty is best summed up by Ridge, op. cit. supra note 12, at 251:
(T)he first step in due process seemingly places responsibility on the
District Court to see that an indigent defendant is represented by counsel
in connection with his right to appeal . . . (I)t appears that the first pro-
cedural step, after trial, conviction and sentence of an indigent defendant
in the District Court, is for the trial judge to determine whether trial
appointed counsel has advised the indigent defendant of his right to appeal
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meet the constitutional mandate to equalize the opportunity for noting
an appeal. Indigent defendants appearing with assigned counsel have
less opportunity for filing notice of appeal than any other class of de-
fendants.2 5 There is a much greater likelihood that assigned counsel, as
compared to retained counsel, will terminate their services upon sentenc-
ing,26 as the frequency of pro se notices of appeal substantiates.2 7 The
practice of assigning counsel before trial and again by the appellate court
after notice of appeal is filed contributes to the likelihood that the assistance
of assigned counsel will lapse upon sentencing as it did in the instant
case.28 The affirmative duty is well within the anticipation of the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.29 In order to afford equal
opportunity to appeal, the trial court must affirmatively inquire into in-
tentions of assigned counsel at sentencing.
The court might have reached the result it did on the ground of of-
ficial interference with filing notice of appeal or incompetency of assigned
counsel. Intentional prevention of timely notice by the state through one
and made known to him any "possible error" committed at the trial which
that counsel might consider as the basis for appeal, before he is permitted
to withdraw from the case, or the defendant is allowed to reject such
counsel and proceed pro se.
See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722-26 (1948); Hodges v. United States,
282 F.2d 858, 862 (D.C.Cir. 1960) (separate opinion); Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d
721, 722-23 (10th Cir. 1948); Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865, 870 (D.C.Cir. 1941);
State v. Frodsham, 139 Mont. 222, 232-33, 362 P.2d 413, 418 (1961).
25 Defendants with retained counsel have the opportunities with which the
court must provide the indigent. Defendants without counsel will be advised by
the court of the right to appeal and may have the court note an appeal automatically
under Rule 37(a) (2). Whether indigents who do not waive the right to counsel are
represented with respect to their right to appeal depends on what the attorneys
appearing at sentencing include within their obligations to represent indigent defend-
ants. Assigned counsel may not consider advice on the right to appeal as part of
their obligations, Ridge, op. cit. supra note 12, at 251. In fact, an attorney may appear
with an indigent defendant at sentencing without representing him at all. Gadsden v.
United States, 223 F2d 627 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
26 Appointed counsel are often young, unpaid and lacking in experience and
enthusiasm. Erwin, "Uncompensated Counsel: They do not Meet the Constitutional
Mandate," 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963). Cost of appeal is frequently prohibitive due to
the heavy personal sacrifice involved, 109 Cong. Rec. 230 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1963)
(remarks of Senator Hruska), and representation often terminates upon sentencing.
Ridge, op. cit. supra note 12, at 251.
27 See Coppedge v. United States, supra note 13, at 446; Fallen v. United States,
306 F.2d 697, 706 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion), cert. granted, 374 U.S.
826 (1963) (No. 811, 1962 Term; renumbered No. 210, 1963 Term).
28 Coppedge v. United States, supra note 13, at 446; Johnson v. United States,
supra note 16, at 566.
29 Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b) provides:
Procedure not Otherwise Specified. If no procedure is specifically prescribed
by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with
these rules or with any applicable statute.
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of its officers or agents has been held sufficient reason not to give the
limitation effect.30 The government has the duty to provide means of
affording adequate and effective review to indigent defendants and it can-
not avoid performing that duty through the negligent or intentional acts
of its own agents or officials. Turning to the instant case, the district
court judge, a governmental official, failed to fulfill his duty to advise
Boruff of his rights concerning appeal, a duty which arose because assigned
counsel, a quasi-governmental official, failed properly to represent Boruff.
In a recent state case the limitation ran after assigned counsel, without
informing the defendant, decided that no appeal should be taken. Default
in filing notice of appeal was attributed to the state because a statute placed
the responsibility on court appointed counsel to take the necessary pro-
cedural steps to effectuate an appeal. 31 Default in filing notice of appeal in
Boruff can be attributed to the federal government, because Rule 37(a) (2)
specifically recognizes the duty of the government to advise indigent de-
fendants not represented by counsel of their rights concerning appeal and
effectively delegates such duty by implication to assigned counsel where
the indigent is represented.3 2
Boruff was entitled to be represented by a competent attorney. Mis-
conduct amounting to a breach of a legal duty faithfully to represent
the client's interests has been said to be sufficient to show incompetency.33
But the showing usually required is that the trial be so fundamentally
unfair as to amount to a farce and a mockery of justice.34 Boruff's
counsel apparently properly preserved the question of venue,35 but his
erroneous decision not to appeal, implied in his letter to the district
court, suggests a question of competency. 36 The question before the court
might have been the competency of the representation rather than the
presence or absence of representation. Interestingly, the court did not
consider the question of competency in its opinion. The low standard
of competency makes it questionable whether Boruff's counsel would have
been found incompetent. Hence, it may be concluded that the court, by
leaping over the question of competency to a finding of no representation,
effectively raised the constitutional standard for attorney conduct.
The question remains whether the limitation will be tolled under the
doctrine of the instant case where assigned counsel's conduct does not
30 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
31 Coffman v. Bomar, 220 F.Supp. 343 (D.Tenn. 1963).
32 See note 21, supra.
33 Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 994 (1959).
34 Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
865 (1954).
35 310 F.2d at 922. Boruff's counsel raised the question of venue by motion
at the outset of the trial, but the district court erroneously submitted the question
to the jury.
36 310 F.2d at 920. Boruff's assigned counsel wrote a letter to the district
court explaining what took place between himself and Boruff concerning Boruff's
right to appeal. Part of this letter is found in the instant case.
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constitute such blatant abandonment of the indigent defendant. If an
indigent defendant is advised in good faith that he has no cause
for appeal but not of the limitation, should the limitation be tolled until the
indigent is so advised? It has been said that the indigent defendant is
entitled to the advice and judgment of assigned counsel and nothing more,3 7
but it is clear that his right to appeal still exists even if counsel believes
appeal should not be taken. 38 Therefore, such a defendant is entitled to
be advised of his right to appeal and of the cruciality of the limitation as
well as of the merits of the appeal. However, an indigent defendant afforded
professional judgment as to the merits of the appeal comes closer to receiv-
ing equal justice than Boruff, who had no advice on the merits or proced-
ure of appeal. Whether or not equal opportunity of appeal is sufficiently
denied to toll the statute is not clear. In order to avoid any question of
equal opportunity in this situation, it is counsel's duty to advise the court
at the time of sentencing of his intention not to note an appeal. The
court could then note an appeal if the indigent defendant desired. If,
after sentencing, assigned counsel decides not to note an appeal, he should
be bound to advise the indigent defendant of the limitation and how to
note an appeal pro se.39
A different problem is presented where assigned counsel intends to
file notice of appeal but neglects to do so in time. The indigent defendant
is entitled to equal opportunity and no more. The only distinction with
respect to equal opportunity between retained and assigned counsel turns on
whether the latter has greater propensity to be negligent than the former.
Such a fine line would be difficult to draw. The limitation would not be
tolled.
Departure from the traditional view espoused by the dissent is a
prudent recognition of change in the law and of the lack of magic in classi-
fying the limitation as jurisdictional. The Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure have no more force and effect than statutes and must be interpreted
consistently with the growth of the law.4 0 In United States v. Robinson,
the court suggested leaving problems relating to inconsistencies and ob-
scurities in the rules to the rule making process,," but the courts, not
Congress, have traditionally taken the strides toward equality of justice.42
There is still far to go to achieve equality under the law with respect to
those afflicted with poverty.4 3 In Coppedge v. United States it was said:
37 Lewis v. United States, 294 F.2d 209, 211 (D.C.Cir. 1960).
38 Thompson v. Johnston, 160 F2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1947) (dissenting
opinion).
39 Supra notes 21, 24.
40 Gallagher v. United States, 82 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1936).
41 Supra note 4, at 229.
42 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1962); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1961); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Johnson v. United States, supra note 16; Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
43 United States v. Johnson, supra note 10, at 572.
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When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty
or property, it takes most awesome steps. No general respect
for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected
without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt,
eminently fair and sober criminal procedures. The methods we
employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been
called the measure by which the quality of our civilization may be
judged.44
The courts have an affirmative duty to keep the rules from operating to
defeat their purpose. It is shockingly unfair to allow the rights of an
indigent to be lost when the court should be aware of the indigent's
ignorance and peril. The proposed federal public defender system would
help to solve the problem, for the compensation it provides would elim-
inate the primary factor which causes the disparity between the representa-
tion afforded by retained and assigned counsel.4 5 The solution which
avails of immediate implementation, simplicity and economy of adminis-
tration, is founded on the district court's affirmative duty to inquire and
advise, not only of the rights concerning appeal, but also of the right to
assigned counsel on appeal. Without knowledge of the right to assigned
counsel, the right to appeal may seem meaningless and go unexercised.
"The prevention of undue restraints on liberty is more important than
mechanical and unrealistic administration of the federal courts. '46
44 Supra note 13, at 449.
45 109 Cong. Rec. 227 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1963).
46 Wade v. Mays, 334 U.S. 678, 681 (1948).
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